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Abstract
Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., forthcoming) studied schedule matching where one
determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the
assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule
matching under more general preferences that extend the substitutable preferences in Roth
(Econometrica 52 (1984) 47) by an extension of the revealed preference approach in Alkan
(Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 737). We give a generalization of the Gale–Shapley algorithm and
show that some familiar properties of ordinary stable matchings continue to hold. Our main
result is that, when preferences satisfy an additional property called size monotonicity, stable
matchings are a lattice under the joint preferences of all agents on each side and have other
interesting structural properties.
r 2003 Published by Elsevier Science (USA).
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1. Introduction
The formulation of the Stable Matching Problem [11] was originally motivated by
the real world problem of college admissions. It was an attempt to find a rational
criterion for matching students with colleges which respected the preferences of both
groups. The original approach was to first consider a special case, the so-called
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Stable Marriage Problem in which each college could accept only one student. The
general case was then reduced to the marriage case by assuming that each college had
a complete preference ordering on the set of students it was willing to admit as well
as a quota giving an upper bound to the number of students that could be admitted.
The model has applications in other situations. A particularly natural application is
the problem of hiring of workers by firms. In general we refer to such a model as a
market and the participants on the two sides as agents.
The present paper presents a broad generalization of the original model
incorporating extensions in several directions.
(1) The market is symmetric in the sense that all agents may form multiple
partnerships (with agents on the other side of the market.)
(2) Preferences of agents over sets of possible partners are given by choice
functions that are more general than those given by complete orderings of
individuals. This is especially relevant for the college market where colleges are
typically interested in the overall composition of an entering class, particularly these
days as regards diversity.1 A simple example will illustrate the point.
College A can admit two students. The applicants are two men m and m0 and two
women w and w0:
A’s first choice is the pair mw but if m ðwÞ is not available the choice is m0wðmw0Þ:
One sees at once that these choices are not possible from any strict ordering of the
students. For example if the ordering was m4w4m04w0 then it would mean that
mm0 was preferred to the diversified pair m0w0:
Indeed, as regards diversity, in the algorithm which solves the original college
admissions problem, there is nothing to prevent a college from ending up with a class
which is either ninety percent male or female.
The remedy for this via choice functions simply formalizes what happens
approximately in actual negotiations between colleges and students or firms and
workers. Each agent is assumed to have a choice function C which, given a set P of
agents on the other side of the market, picks out the most preferred subset S ¼ CðPÞ
contained in P: S is then said to be revealed preferred to all other subsets of P: The
case where colleges rank-order applicants is then a special case in which CðPÞ
consists of the q highest ranked applicants in P; but if, for example, the goal was
gender balance one could choose, roughly, the highest ranked q=2 applicants of each
sex or if, say there was an insufficient number of male applicants then choose all the
men and fill the quota with the highest ranked women.
Choice functions have been a standard tool in the matching literature since Roth
[15] which followed the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford [13] in broadening the
matching model and allowing more general preferences. (In fact the symmetric
multiple partnership model goes back to [15]). The revealed preference ordering was
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1We quote Mr. Bollinger, the president of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor: ‘‘Admissions is not
and should not be a linear process of lining up applicants according to their grades and test scores and then
drawing a line through the list. It shows the importance of seeing racial and ethnic diversity in a broader
context of diversity, which is geographic and international and socio-economic and athletic and all the
various forms of differences, complementary differences, that we draw on to compose classes year after
year.’’
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first utilized by Blair [7] under somewhat different terminology, and the approach
was further developed by Alkan [1,2] which we adopt and extend here.
It is worth pointing out that we do not assume as Roth [15] and Blair [7] do that
agents have a complete ordering of subsets of agents on the other side of the market.
In our approach there is only a partial ordering on subsets. In the original college
admissions model, for example, if a college with quota 2 ranks students a4b4c then
by revealed preference the pair ab is preferred to bc and ac; since given the triple abc
the pair ab is chosen, but the pairs ac and bc remain incomparable. Indeed, however,
for any of the conclusions reached in this paper, it does not matter whether ac is
preferred to bc or vice versa. Thus it is unnecessary to make assumptions about
whether, for instance, a firm would rather hire its first, fifth and sixth best worker or
its second, third and fourth. The (incomplete) revealed preference ordering turns out
to contain all the relevant information.
(3) Recently Baiou and Balinski [4] have generalized the notion of matching to
that of a schedule matching. In the context of a set of workers W with members w
and a set of firms F with members f ; the idea is that a firm decides not only which
workers it will hire but also how many hours of employment to give each of them.
Similarly, the workers must decide how many of their available hours to allocate to
each job. A schedule is then a F  W matrix X whose entries xð fwÞ give the amount
of time worker w works for firm f : The schedule matching is said to be (pairwise)
stable if there is no pair f and w who could make themselves better off by increasing
the hours they work together while not increasing (possibly decreasing) the hours
they work with their other partners.2 This is the natural generalization of (pairwise)
stability for ordinary matchings which, in fact, correspond to the special case of
schedule matchings where all entries of X are either 0 or 1. In [4] it is assumed that
we are in the ‘‘classical’’ case where each agent has a strict ordering of the agents on
the other side of the market and preferences on schedules are given by the condition
that an agent, say a worker w; is made better off if he can increase the time he works
for firm f by reducing the time he works for some less preferred firm f :
The present paper studies schedule matching under more general (revealed)
preferences. Our main result shows that under appropriate conditions which include
the classical case the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice with other
interesting structural properties. (For example, a worker may have different
schedules under two different stable matchings but he will necessarily work the
same number of hours in each.) This extends the results of Alkan [2] for the case of
ordinary matchings and some of the arguments below are natural extensions of those
in [2].
In the next section we develop the necessary material on the revealed preference
ordering of an individual and show that if the choice function is consistent and
persistent (to be defined) then the set of all acceptable schedules has the structure of a
(non-distributive) lattice with other important properties. These properties are then
used in the following section first to prove that stable schedules always exist (the
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2We restrict attention to pairwise stable matchings because if coalitions other than pairs can form to
block a matching, then stable matchings may fail to exist. See [19].
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proof uses an extension to schedules of the standard Gale–Shapley algorithm.) We
next show how to extend to the case of schedules some basic properties of ordinary
stable matchings. The lattice properties of the set of stable matchings are derived in
the two subsections that follow. A final section gives examples showing the necessity
of the various assumptions on individual preferences and pointing out some
properties of matchings which do not generalize to the case of schedules.
It should be mentioned that there is a well-known parallel matching literature of
buyers-and-sellers where prices or salaries appear explicitly and one looks at the
competitive equilibrium allocations. This literature originating from [18] has recently
been expanding in remarkable ways (see [3,5,9,12]). Some of our results have their
analogues in these works. For comparison it is worth mentioning that the key
condition behind those results is the gross substitutability condition on demand
correspondences that was introduced into the matching literature by Kelso and
Crawford [13]. The corresponding property for ordinary matchings (under the
assumption that preferences are strict) has been called substitutability by Roth [15]
and our key assumption of persistence is simply the generalization of this property to
the case of schedules.
2. The individual
In the matching theory of later section we will think of economic agents as firms
and workers, or students and colleges, men and women, etc. However, the theory of
revealed preference of the individual belongs to the general standard model of
consumption or demand theory, and it will be presented in this context here.
An agent (consumer) chooses (demands) amounts of n items (goods) from given
availabilities of each item. This is formalized as follows:
Let Rnþ be the nonnegative orthant, b an upper bound vector and B ¼
fxARnþjxpbg: Let B be a subset of B which is closed under 3 and 4 (the standard
join and meet in Rn). A choice function is a map C : B-B such that
CðxÞpx
for all xAB: The elements x ¼ ðxð1Þ;y; xðnÞÞ of the domain B will be called choice
vectors. The range of C is denoted by A and its elements are called (acceptable)
schedules. The most relevant domains for our purposes are the divisible domain B
itself and the discrete domain that consists of all the integer vectors in B. When all
bounds are equal to 1, the discrete domain corresponds to the case of ordinary
multipartner matching as in college admissions.
An important special case of our model is one in which the items can be measured
in some common unit, for example, dollars worth for goods, or man-hours for
services. In this case we denote the sum of the entries of a vector x by jxj and call it
the size of x: In such a model an agent may have a quota q which bounds the size of
the schedule he can choose. For the college admissions case q is the maximum
number of students a college can admit.
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A choice function C is called quota filling if
jCðxÞj ¼ q if jxjXq and CðxÞ ¼ x otherwise:
Two interesting examples of quota filling choice functions are as follows:
Example 1. The items are ranked so that, say, item i is more desirable than i þ 1:
Given a choice vector x with jxj4q; let j be the item such that r ¼ P j xðiÞpq and
r þ xð j þ 1Þ4q: Then
CðxÞ ¼ ðxð1Þ;y; xð jÞ; q  r; 0;y; 0Þ:
Thus, the agent fills as much of his quota as possible with the most desirable items.
We will henceforth refer to this C as the classical choice function.
Example 2. The domain is B: Given a choice vector x with jxj4q; let r be the
number such that
P
i r4xðiÞ ¼ q: Then
CðxÞ ¼ ðr4xð1Þ;y; r4xðnÞÞ:
In words, the agent tries to use all items as equally as possible. (On the discrete
domain, there may be more than one such best-schedule hence a tie-breaking
criterion is necessary.) We will refer to C as the diversifying choice function.
As an illustration, suppose an agent with quota 5 is given the choice vector
(2,1,0,4,2). Then, the classical choice function chooses the schedule (2,1,0,2,0) while
the diversifying choice function chooses ð4=3; 1; 0; 4=3; 4=3Þ:
2.1. The revealed preference lattice
Definition. We say that xAA is revealed preferred to yAA; and write xky; if
Cðx3yÞ ¼ x: We write xgy if xky and xay:
We now impose some standard conditions on the choice function C:
Definition. C is consistent if CðxÞpypx implies CðyÞ ¼ CðxÞ:
This is a highly plausible assumption. Applied to college admissions, it says that if
some set S of students is chosen for admission from a pool P then the same set will
be chosen from any subset of P which contains S:
An immediate consequence of consistency is that CðxÞ ¼ x if and only if xAA:
Without some further restrictions, revealed preference will not be transitive, hence
not a partial ordering, as shown by the following example for the college admissions
case.
Example 3. A college can admit two students from two men m; m0 and two women
w; w0: The pair mw is its first choice, but if either w or m are not available then
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ðiÞ Cðmm0w0Þ ¼ mw0;
ðiiÞ Cðm0ww0Þ ¼ m0w0:
(In the case of college admissions, we will use the customary notation and represent a
choice vector or schedule x by the set of all students s for whom xðsÞ ¼ 1:)
Transitivity fails because from (i) we have mw0gm0w0 and from (ii) m0w0gm0w but
mw0 and m0w are not comparable since Cðmw0m0wÞ ¼ mw:
In fact a consistent choice function may exhibit Condorcet type cycles even if it
enjoys the quota filling property:
Example 4. A firm with quota 3 may face any subset of 5 workers a; b; c; d; e: Worker
b is productive only with a so if a is not available b will not be chosen. Likewise for c
and b; respectively, and for a and c: Thus CðabcdeÞ ¼ CðabcdÞ ¼ CðabceÞ ¼ abc;
and CðbcdeÞ ¼ cde; CðacdeÞ ¼ ade; CðabdeÞ ¼ bde; so
cdegadegbdegcde:
To avoid these situations, we introduce the following condition of persistence
which, as mentioned earlier, is a generalization of the condition of substitutability
that has widely been used in ordinary matching models since Roth [15].
Definition. C is persistent if xXy implies CðyÞXCðxÞ4y:
For the college admissions problem, persistence (substitutability) means that if a
college offers admission to a student from a given pool of applicants then it will also
admit him if the pool of applicants is reduced. This is violated by the choice function
in Example 3: the agent likes the couple mw most but prefers m0w0 to any other
couple if m is not available. In general, persistence rules out the sort of
complementarity exhibited here between m0 and w0:
It is easy to verify that the classical and diversifying choice functions satisfy
consistency and persistence.
An immediate consequence of persistence is that if xAA and xXy then yAA:
Definition. C is subadditive if Cðx3yÞpCðxÞ3y for all x; y:
Lemma 1. If C is persistent then it is subadditive.
Proof. Since Cðx3yÞpx3y; we have
Cðx3yÞ ¼ Cðx3yÞ4ðx3yÞ ¼ ðCðx3yÞ4xÞ3ðCðx3yÞ4yÞ ð1Þ
by distributivity. Since xpx3y; we have Cðx3yÞ4xpCðxÞ by persistence. Also
Cðx3yÞ4ypy: Substituting these two inequalities in (1) gives subadditivity. &
Definition. C is stationary if Cðx3yÞ ¼ CðCðxÞ3yÞ for all x; y:
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Lemma 2. If C is subadditive and consistent then it is stationary.
Proof. By subadditivity Cðx3yÞpCðxÞ3y: Also CðxÞ3ypx3y: So CðCðxÞ3yÞ ¼
Cðx3yÞ by consistency. &
In the case of ordinary matching the condition of stationarity has been called path
independence as in [14] where it was introduced in a somewhat different setup.
It will be assumed from here on that all choice functions are consistent and
persistent.
Notation. We write x<y for Cðx3yÞ:
As immediate consequence of stationarity, we have
Corollary 1. The relation k is transitive and x<y is the least upper bound of x and y:
Proof. The operation < is associative: ðx<yÞ<z ¼ CðCðx3yÞ3zÞ ¼
Cððx3yÞ3zÞ ¼ Cðx3ðy3zÞÞ ¼ Cðx3Cðy3zÞÞ ¼ x<ðy<zÞ: Thus, if xky; ykz
then x<z ¼ ðx<yÞ<z ¼ x<ðy<zÞ ¼ x<y ¼ x so xkz: Also, if zkx; zky then
z<ðx<yÞ ¼ ðz<xÞ<y ¼ z<y ¼ z so zkx<y: &
Thus, the set of schedules A is an upper-semilattice (with join <) in the partial
order given byk: It is, in fact, a lattice and we will need an expression for its meet;:
First note, it follows at once from stationarity that if CðxÞ ¼ z and CðyÞ ¼ z then
Cðx3yÞ ¼ z:
Definition. The closure %xAB of xAA is supfyABjCðyÞ ¼ xg:
In the classical college admissions case, %x consists of x together with all students
ranked below the least desired student in x:
We henceforth assume that C is continuous. It then follows that Cð %xÞ ¼ x:
Lemma 3. The revealed preference meet is given by x;y ¼ Cð %x4 %yÞ:
Proof. We must show (i) Cð %x4 %yÞ%x (and Cð %x4 %yÞ%y) and (ii) z%x and z%y
implies z%Cð %x4 %yÞ:
By definition (i) is true if and only if CðCð %x4 %yÞ3xÞ ¼ x: By stationarity this is
equivalent to Cðx0Þ ¼ x where x0 ¼ ð %x4 %yÞ3x and, since xpx0p %x and Cð %xÞ ¼ x; the
result follows by consistency.
To prove (ii) we must show that CðCð %x4 %yÞ3zÞ ¼ Cðð %x4 %yÞ3zÞ (by stationarity)
¼ Cð %x4 %yÞ; so note that z%x means Cðx3zÞ ¼ x; hence by definition of closure
x3zp %x; so zp %x and similarly zp %y so zp %x4 %y so ð %x4 %yÞ3z ¼ %x4 %y and the result
follows. &
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Note that in college admissions, x;y may include students who are neither in x
nor y: Suppose there are four students 1; 2; 3; 4 ranked in that order, and x ¼
f1; 3g; y ¼ f2; 3g: Then x;y ¼ f3; 4g:
We will need some further properties of the revealed preference lattice.
Lemma 4. x;yXx4 %y:
Proof. Since %xX %x4 %y; we have from persistence
x;y ¼ Cð %x4 %yÞXCð %xÞ4 %x4 %y ¼ x4 %x4 %y ¼ x4 %y: &
Lemma 5. ðx;yÞ4ðx<yÞpx4y:
Proof. Since %x3 %yX %x; we have from persistence Cð %xÞ ¼ xXCð %x3 %yÞ4 %x ¼ ðx<yÞ4 %x
from stationarity, and similarly yXðx<yÞ4 %y; so
x4yXðx<yÞ4ð %x4 %yÞXðx<yÞ4Cð %x4 %yÞ ¼ ðx<yÞ4ðx;yÞ from Lemma 3. &
2.2. Satiation
In extending the concept of stability from ordinary to schedule matchings in the
next section we need to formalize the notion that an agent would not prefer to have
more of a given item if it were available. For this purpose the following definition is
basic.
Definition. A schedule x is i-satiated if CiðyÞpxðiÞ for all yXx:
In words, x is i-satiated if the agent would not choose more of item i if it were
offered with no reduction in the availability of other items. To illustrate, in the
classical case, x is i-satiated if i is the highest ranked item with xð jÞ ¼ 0 for ’j4i: For
the diversifying choice function, x is i-satiated if xðiÞ ¼ maxj fxð jÞg:
The following properties will be needed in the next section.
Lemma 6. x is i-satiated if there exists yXx; yðiÞ4xðiÞ such that CðyÞ ¼ x:
Proof. Suppose zXx and zði ’Þ4xðiÞ (otherwise there is nothing to prove). Let y0 ¼
z4y and note that y0ðiÞ4xðiÞ: Now yXy0Xx so by consistency Cðy0Þ ¼ CðyÞ ¼ x:
Also zXy0 so by persistence xXCðy0ÞXCðzÞ4y0 in particular xðiÞXCiðzÞ4y0ðiÞ but
since y0ðiÞ4xðiÞ we have CiðzÞpxðiÞ: &
Lemma 7. x is i-satiated if and only if %xðiÞ ¼ bðiÞ:
Proof. If xðiÞ ¼ bðiÞ there is nothing to prove so suppose xðiÞobðiÞ: If %xðiÞ ¼ bðiÞ
then x is i-satiated by the previous lemma. If x is i-satiated then let y ¼ x3bi where
bi is the vector with ith entry bðiÞ and others 0: Then from satiation CiðyÞpxðiÞ and
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since CjðyÞpxð jÞ for jai we have CðyÞpxpy so by consistency CðyÞ ¼ CðxÞ ¼ x so
yp %x so %xðiÞ ¼ bðiÞ: &
Lemma 8. Suppose xky:
(i) If y is i-satiated then x is i-satiated.
(ii) If xðiÞ4yðiÞ then y is not i-satiated.
Proof. (i) Using stationarity and the assumption that xky; we get Cð %x3 %yÞ ¼
Cðx3yÞ ¼ x: So by definition of closure %xX %x3 %y thus %xX %y in particular %xðiÞX %yðiÞ ¼
bðiÞ so x is i-satiated by the previous lemma. (ii) Since xky we have x3yXy and
Cðx3yÞ ¼ x so Ciðx3yÞ ¼ xðiÞ4yðiÞ so y is not i-satiated. &
Lemma 9. (i) If x or y is i-satiated then x<y is i-satiated.
(ii) If x and y are i-satiated then x;y is i-satiated.
Proof. (i) Say x is i-satiated. Then since x<ykx the conclusion follows from Lemma
8(i). (ii) We have Cððx;yÞ3biÞ ¼ CðCð %x4 %yÞ3biÞ ¼ Cðð %x4 %yÞ3biÞ (by stationarity)
¼ Cðð %x3biÞ4ð %y3biÞÞ ¼ Cð %x4 %yÞ (using Lemma 7, since x and y are i-satiated)
¼ x;y: &
3. Stable matchings
We now consider two finite sets of agents which we interpret as firms, F ; with
members f ; and workers, W ; with members w; having respectively the choice
functions Cf ; Cw; with ranges Af ;Aw: We write <f ;;f ;kf for the join, meet,
preference ordering for f ; and similarly for w:
A matching X is a nonnegative F  W matrix whose entries, written xð fwÞ;
represent the amount of time w works for f : We write xð f Þ for the f -row and xðwÞ
for the w-column of X : We assume all matchings X are bounded above by some
positive matrix B: The choice functions CF ; CW are defined from Cf ; Cw in the
natural way.
The revealed preference ordering for agents translates in an obvious way to an
ordering on matchings.
Definition (Group preference). The matching X is preferred to Y by F ; written
XkF Y ; if xð f Þkf yð f Þ for all f in F :
Definition (Acceptability). A matching X is F-acceptable if xð f ÞAAf for all f ; and
it is W-acceptable if xðwÞAAw for all w: It is acceptable if it is both F and W -
acceptable.
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The fundamental stability notion is now formalized as follows:
Definition (Stability). An acceptable matching X is stable if, for every pair fw; either
xð f Þ is w-satiated or xðwÞ is f -satiated (or both).
It is straightforward to check that, under persistence, the above definition is
precisely the condition that there exists no ‘‘blocking’’ pair.
3.1. Existence
We will show that stable matchings always exist by constructing a sequence of
alternately F - and W -acceptable matchings which converge to a stable matching.
The method is a natural generalization of the Gale–Shapley algorithm of offers and
counteroffers where choice functions are particularly natural. The starting choice
vector for each firm f is bf ; namely the vector giving the maximum hours each
worker can work with f ; and the firms offer the employment vectors Cf ðbf Þ: These
employment offers then become the choice vectors for the workers who accept or
reject them using their own choice functions and, in turn, the ‘‘counter’’ offers so
chosen by the workers determine (in a natural way formalized in the proof below)
the new choice vectors for the firms, and so on. Of course the proof must make use of
persistence of all firms’ and workers’ choice functions since counterexamples exist if
this condition is not satisfied (see Section 4). One difference from the discrete case is
the fact that the sequence of acceptable matchings need not terminate after a finite
number of iterations and therefore it may be necessary to take the limit of the
sequence in order to determine the stable matching.
Theorem 1 (Existence). There exists a stable matching.
Proof. Define the sequences ðBkÞ; ðX kÞ; ðY kÞ by the following recursion rule:
B0 ¼ B;
X k ¼ CF ðBkÞ;
Y k ¼ CW ðX kÞ;
and Bkþ1 is obtained from Bk as follows:
bkþ1ð fwÞ ¼ bkð fwÞ if ykð fwÞ ¼ xkð fwÞ;
bkþ1ð fwÞ ¼ ykð fwÞ if ykð fwÞoxkð fwÞ:
In words: the matrices Bk are the choice matrices for the firms; X k are the firms’
offers and act as workers’ choice matrices, Y k are the workers’ counter offers. The
recursion follows the rule that (i) if worker w has fully accepted the offer by firm f
then f can make any offer to w that it could in the previous round and (ii) if w has
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not fully accepted the offer by firm f then f cannot offer more hours than those
counteroffered by w:
Note that ðBkÞ is a nonincreasing nonnegative sequence and hence converges, so
by continuity of CF it follows that ðX kÞ converges, and hence by continuity of CW it
follows that ðY kÞ converges. Call the limits Bˆ; bX ; Yˆ: We will show,
(i) bX ¼ Yˆ and hence it is acceptable,
(ii) bXð¼ YˆÞ is stable.
To prove (i), note that Y kpX kpBk: If, for some fw; xˆð fwÞ  yˆð fwÞ4e; then
xkð fwÞ  ykð fwÞ4e for infinitely many k and therefore from the recursion rule
bkð fwÞ  bkþ1ð fwÞ4e which is impossible since Bk converges so bX ¼ Yˆ: (In the
special case where X n is W -acceptable for some n; Y n ¼ X n so Bnþ1 ¼ Bn so X nþ1 ¼
X n so bX ¼ Yˆ ¼ X n:)
To prove (ii), we first show that Y kþ1kW Y k; thus workers are ‘‘better off’’ after
each step of the recursion. From the recursion rule Y kpBkþ1pBk; so from
persistence we have
CF ðBkþ1Þ ¼ X kþ1XCF ðBkÞ4Bkþ1XX k4Y k ¼ Y k;
so Y kþ1 ¼ CW ðX kþ1Þ is revealed preferred to Y k: It follows by continuity that
YˆkW Y
k: ð2Þ
Now suppose yˆð f Þ is not w-satiated. Then from Lemma 7 yˆð fwÞobð fwÞ so from the
recursion rule, for some k; ykð fwÞoxkð fwÞ so, since ykðwÞ ¼ CwðxkðwÞÞpxkðwÞ;
from Lemma 6 we have ykðwÞ is f -satiated and from (2) yˆðwÞkw ykðwÞ; so from
Lemma 8(i) yˆðwÞ is f -satiated. This proves stability of Yˆ: &
3.2. Polarity, optimality, comparative statics
The following are extensions of familiar properties of the ordinary matching
market (see [7,8,17]).
Lemma 10. Let X be a stable matching and let Y be an F-acceptable matching such
that YkF X : Then CW ðX3YÞ ¼ X :
Proof. If the conclusion is false, then there is some w such that CwðxðwÞ3yðwÞÞ ¼
zðwÞaxðwÞ: Hence, zðwÞgw xðwÞ; so zð fwÞ4xð fwÞ for some f ; hence from Lemma
8(ii) xðwÞ is not f -satiated, but zð fwÞpyð fwÞ so xð fwÞoyð fwÞ and by hypothesis
yð f Þkf xð f Þ so again by Lemma 8(ii) xð f Þ is not w-satiated, contradicting stability
of X : &
Corollary 2 (Polarity). If X ; Y are stable matchings then XkF Y3YkW X :
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
41
43
45
A. Alkan, D. Gale / Journal of Economic Theory ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 11
YJETH : 3060
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
Theorem 2 (Optimality). If bX is the matching given by the Existence Theorem and X
is any other stable matching then bXkF X :
Proof. Let X be a stable matching. We will show that XpBˆ where Bˆ is the matrix
given in the Existence Theorem. Since bX ¼ CF ðBˆÞ; the conclusion follows. So
suppose not. Then there is an index k such that BkXX k but bkþ1ð fwÞoxð fwÞ for
some fw: From the recursion rules, this means that
ykð fwÞoxð fwÞ and ykð fwÞoxkð fwÞ: ð3Þ
Now X k ¼ CF ðBkÞ so X kkF X so from Lemma 10 CW ðX3X kÞ ¼ X : But
X3X kXX k so from persistence Y k ¼ CW ðX kÞXX k4CðX3X kÞ ¼ X k3X so
ykð fwÞXxkð fwÞ4xð fwÞ for all fw which contradicts (3). &
Suppose a new firm or a new worker enters the market. The following theorem
shows that, in the firm-optimal matching, in the first case no firm is better off and no
worker worse off, while in the second case no worker is better off and no firm worse
off. Formally, let bX be the firm-optimal matching in the original F  W market, and
let cXf (respectively bXo) denote the F  W component of the firm-optimal matching
in the market with an additional firm f (worker o:)
Theorem 3 (Comparative statics). (i) bXkF cXf and cXfkW bX ; (ii) cXokF bX and
bXkW cXo:
Proof. To prove (i), we continue the algorithm of the Existence Theorem. The new
firm f offers an employment schedule xf which gives a new offer schedule X 0 to W
where X 0XX and since workers get no worse off with each step of the recursion they
are at least well off under bXf as under bX : The firms are no better off since their
choice matrix can never exceed Bˆ:
To prove (ii), we suppose the original market includes o but bo ¼ 0: We denote by
ðBkÞ; ðX kÞ; ðY kÞ and ðB0kÞ; ðX 0kÞ; ðY 0kÞ; respectively, the sequences in the Existence
Theorem recursion for the original and new market. Note B0XB: It suffices to show
that B0kXBk and x0kðwÞpxkðwÞ for all k and waw0: Assume this is true up to k:
Since B0kXBk; we have by persistence X k ¼ CF ðBkÞXCF ðB0kÞ4Bk ¼ X 0k4Bk so
xkð fwÞXx0kð fwÞ4bkð fwÞ but for waw0 we have bkð fwÞ ¼ b0kð fwÞ; hence
xkðwÞXx0kðwÞ: This shows that no W -worker is better off in the new market.
To show that no firm is worse off, we show that B
0kXBk for all k: Since
xkðwÞXx0kðwÞ for waw0; we have by persistence y0kðwÞXykðwÞ4x0kðwÞ: There are
two cases: If x0kð fwÞpykð fwÞ then y0kð fwÞ ¼ x0kð fwÞ so from the recursion rule
b0kþ1 ¼ b0kXbkXbkþ1: If on the other hand xkð fwÞXx0kð fwÞ4ykð fwÞ then by
consistency y0kð fwÞ ¼ ykð fwÞ so from the recursion rule bkþ1ð fwÞ ¼ ykð fwÞ ¼
y0kð fwÞpb0kþ1ð fwÞ; completing the proof. &
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3.3. The stable matching lattice
Let X ; X 0 be an arbitrary pair of matchings fixed throughout this section. We write
X F ¼ X<F X 0 for the matching whose f -row, xF ð f Þ; is xð f Þ<f x0ð f Þ and write XF ¼
X;F X 0 for the matching whose f -row, xF ð f Þ; is xð f Þ;f x0ð f Þ: We define X W ; XW
via w-columns similarly.
Note that if X ; X 0 are acceptable then X F is of course F -acceptable but not in
general W -acceptable.
The following is a key result.
Lemma 11. If X and X 0 are stable matchings then X FpXW :
Proof. We must show that xF ð fwÞpxW ð fwÞ for all fw:
Case (i) xF ð fwÞpxð fwÞ4x0ð fwÞ: Then, since by Lemma 5
xðwÞ4x0ðwÞpxðwÞ;w x0ðwÞ ¼ xW ðwÞ; the conclusion follows.
Case (ii) xð fwÞoxF ð fwÞpx0ð fwÞ: Then, since xF ð f Þkf xð f Þ; we have
by Lemma 9(ii), xð f Þ is not w-satiated, so by stability xðwÞ is f -satiated,
so from Lemma 8 xðwÞð f Þ ¼ bð fwÞ; so xF ð fwÞpxðwÞð f Þ4x0ð fwÞ ¼
ðxðwÞ4x0ðwÞÞð f ÞpðxðwÞ;wx0ðwÞÞð f Þ (again from Lemma 4) ¼ xW ð fwÞ: &
In order to make the above inequality to an equation, it is necessary to make some
further assumption. We will assume that the entries of a schedule are measured in
some common unit so that it makes sense to add them up. The following condition
extends the condition of ‘‘cardinal monotonicity’’ introduced by Alkan [2] (and by
Fleiner [10] also independently.)
Definition. The choice function C is size monotone if xpy implies jCðxÞjpjCðyÞj for
all x; y in A:
Remark. Note that size monotonicity implies that if xky then jxjXjyj since
x3yXy:
The condition means, for example, that if a worker is forced to cut down on the
hours allocated to some firm, then he may choose to work longer for other firms, but
he will not increase his total working hours. In the ordinary matching model the
condition says that if a firm loses the services of one worker it will replace him by at
most one worker. Note that if C is quota filling then it is automatically size
monotone. From size monotonicity, we get:
Theorem 4 (Lattice polarity). If all choice functions are size monotone then X F ¼
XW :
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Proof. First, since for all w; xW ðwÞkxW ðwÞ; it follows from the remark above that
jxW ðwÞjpjxW ðwÞj so jXW j ¼
P
w jxW ðwÞjp
P
w jxW ðwÞj ¼ jX W j; and similarly
jXF jpjX F j: From the previous Lemma jX F jpjXW j; so now
jXF jpjX F jpjXW jpjX W jpjXF j; so jX F j ¼ jXW j; so the conclusion follows, and
also for any agent, say w;
jxW ðwÞj ¼ jxW ðwÞj: & ð4Þ
Theorem 5. The set of stable matchings is a lattice under the orderings kF and kW :
Proof. It suffices to show that X F is a stable matching. By definition X F is F -
acceptable and, since by Theorem 4 X F ¼ XW ; it follows that X F is also W -
acceptable. It remains to show stability, so suppose xF ð f Þ is not w-satiated. Then by
Lemma 10(i) xð f Þ; x0ð f Þ are not w-satiated. So by stability xðwÞ; x0ðwÞ are f -satiated,
so by Lemma 10(ii) xW ðwÞ is f -satiated, but by Theorem 4 again xW ðwÞ is the w-
column of X F ; so X F is stable. &
3.4. Properties of the stable matching lattice
The following property, which says jxðwÞj ¼ jx0ðwÞj for all w; generalizes a result
for the classical model.
Theorem 6 (Unisize). The schedules that an agent may have in any stable matching all
have the same size.
Proof. Note xW ðwÞ<w xðwÞ ¼ xW ðwÞ and xW ðwÞ;w xðwÞ ¼ xðwÞ so from (4)
jxW ðwÞj ¼ jxðwÞj and similarly jxW ðwÞj ¼ jx0ðwÞj: &
An immediate consequence is the following result which was first shown by Roth
and Sotomayor [16] for the classical college admissions model:
Corollary 3. If the choice function of an agent is quota filling and he does not fill his
quota in a stable matching then he has the same schedule in all stable matchings.
Proof. Suppose xð f Þax0ð f Þ and jxð f Þj ¼ jx0ð f Þj ¼ coq: Then jxð f Þ3x0ð f Þj4c; so
by quota filling jxF ð f Þj ¼ jxð f Þ3x0ð f Þj4c; contradicting Theorem 6. &
A striking structural property of stable matchings is that, for all pairs fw;
fxF ð fwÞ; xF ð fwÞg ¼ fxð fwÞ; x0ð fwÞg; stated equivalently in the following form:
Theorem 7 (Complementarity). If X and X 0 are stable matchings X F3XF ¼ X3X 0
and X F4XF ¼ X4X 0:
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Proof. Let f be any firm. First, from Lemma 5 we have
xF ð f Þ4xF ð f Þpxð f Þ4x0ð f Þ: ð5Þ
Secondly, for all w; by lattice polarity (Theorem 4) xF ð fwÞ ¼ xW ð fwÞ ¼
ðxðwÞ<w x0ðwÞÞð f ÞpðxðwÞ3x0ðwÞÞð f Þ ¼ xð fwÞ3x0ð fwÞ; thus xF ð f Þpxð f Þ3x0ð f Þ
so, since xF ð f Þ ¼ xð f Þ<f x0ð f Þpxð f Þ3x0ð f Þ; we have
xF ð f Þ3xF ð f Þpxð f Þ3x0ð f Þ; ð6Þ
so jxF ð f Þj þ jxF ð f Þj  jxF ð f Þ4xF ð f Þj ¼ jxF ð f Þ3xF ð f Þjpjxð f Þ3x0ð f Þj ¼
jxð f Þj þ jx0ð f Þj  jxð f Þ4x0ð f Þj; but from the unisize property (Theorem 6)
jxF ð f Þj ¼ jxF ð f Þj ¼ jxð f Þj ¼ jx0ð f Þj so
jxF ð f Þ4xF ð f ÞjXjxð f Þ4x0ð f Þj; ð7Þ
therefore (5) and (7) are equations, hence (6) also is an equation. &
Complementarity implies that the lattice of stable matchings is distributive:
Definition. A lattice L; with join < and meet ;; is distributive if z<ðz0;z00Þ ¼
ðz<z0Þ;ðz<z00Þ and z;ðz0<z00Þ ¼ ðz;z0Þ<ðz;z00Þ for all z; z0; z00 in L:
Remark. A standard fact in lattice theory (Corollary to Theorem II.13 in Birkhoff
[6]) is that a lattice ðL;<;;Þ is distributive if and only if the following cancellation
law holds:
If z<z0 ¼ z<z00 and z;z0 ¼ z;z00 then z0 ¼ z00 for all z; z0; z00 in L:
Theorem 8 (Distributivity). The ð<F ;;F Þ and ð<W ;;W Þ lattices of stable match-
ings are distributive.
Proof. Let X ; X 0; X 00 be any three stable matchings. If X<F X 0 ¼ X<F X 00 and
X;F X 0 ¼ X;F X 00 then ðX<F X 0Þ3ðX;F X 0Þ ¼ ðX<F X 00Þ3ðX;F X 00Þ and
ðX<F X 0Þ4ðX;F X 0Þ ¼ ðX<F X 00Þ4ðX;F X 00Þ; hence by complementarity (Theo-
rem 7) X3X 0 ¼ X3X 00 and X4X 0 ¼ X4X 00; so by distributivity of 3;4 using
cancellation X 0 ¼ X 00: Thus the cancellation law holds for <F ;;F ; similarly for
<W ;;W ; and the theorem follows from the remark above. &
An important theorem in the classical case asserts that for stable matchings the
schedules xð f Þ and x0ð f Þ are comparable, that is either they are identical or f prefers
one to the other. This was proved for college admissions in [16] and for schedules in
[4]. This result does not hold in the general case as we show in the next section.
However, we will here show that, for classical agents, it is a direct consequence of
complementarity and the unisize property:
Corollary 4. In the classical case let x and y be schedules where xgy: Then xðiÞ40
implies xð jÞXyð jÞ for joi:
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Proof. If yð jÞ4xð jÞ then for some e40 define the schedule xepx3y by xeðiÞ ¼
xðiÞ  e; xeð jÞ ¼ xð jÞ þ e; xeðkÞ ¼ xðkÞ otherwise. Then xegx contradicting
Cðx3yÞ ¼ x: &
Theorem 9. In the classical case if X and X 0 are stable matchings then either
xð f Þgf x0ð f Þ; xð f Þ ¼ x0ð f Þ; or xð f Þ!f x0ð f Þ:
Proof. Let yð f Þ ¼ xF ð f Þ ¼ xð f Þ;f x0ð f Þ: By the unisize property we cannot have
yð f Þoxð f Þ or yð f Þox0ð f Þ: Therefore, if yð f Þ is distinct from xð f Þ and x0ð f Þ then
by complementarity there is a w such that yð fwÞ ¼ xð fwÞ4x0ð fwÞ and there is a w0
such that yð fw0Þ ¼ x0ð fw00Þ4xð fw0Þ: But if, say, w0 is preferred by f to w then since
xð f Þgf yð f Þ and xð fwÞ40 it follows from Corollary 4 that xð fw0ÞXyð fw0Þ;
contradiction. &
4. Examples
In this section we will show by examples the need for our various assumptions. All
examples are in the context of the special case of college admissions.
Example 4. If choice functions are consistent and size monotone but not persistent
then stable matchings may not exist.
There are two colleges A and B and four students m; w; m0; w0: College A has quota
2 and the choice function as in Example 3 so that mwgA mw0gA m0w0gA m0w:
College B has quota 1 and prefers w to m and will not admit m0 or w0: Student m
prefers B to A while student w prefers A to B: Students m0 and w0 prefer being
matched with A to being unmatched.
For every assignment of students to A there is a blocking pair as stated below:
ðA; mwÞ is blocked by B and m;
ðA; mw0Þ is blocked by A and w;
ðA; m0wÞ is blocked by A and w0;
ðA; m0w0Þ and ðB; mÞ is blocked by B and w;
ðA; m0w0Þ and ðB; wÞ is blocked by A and m:
Example 5. If preferences are consistent and persistent but not size monotone then
stable matchings may not form a lattice. More precisely, the (revealed preference)
supremum of stable matchings may not be stable.
There are colleges A;y; E and students a;y; e: Preferences are given by the table
below: A’s first choice is a and second choice ce; similarly for other agents.
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Note that the preferences of A and B violate size monotonicity.
A B C D E a b c d e
a b# c d# e C# D A# B A#
ce# de a# b — A B# C D# B
— — — — — — — — — — E
One easily verifies that the entries marked  and those marked # correspond to
stable matchings: Namely, in each matching, where a college is matched with its
second choice, the preferred student is matched with her first choice. But in the
matching which is the college supremum of  and #; both E and e are unmatched,
hence they block and the college supremum is therefore unstable. Note that the
unisize condition is also violated for A and B in the matchings  and #:
The following two examples show that certain results for the classical model do
not generalize to the nonclassical model (with consistent, persistent and size
monotone choice functions).
Example 6. The college optimal stable matching may not be Pareto optimal for
colleges.
There are colleges A; B; Z with quotas 1; 1; 2; male students m; m0 and female
students w; w0:
Z chooses mw if all four students are available and otherwise chooses the sexually
diverse pair.
The other preferences are given by the table below where the left entry in each pair
is the college’s ranking of the student and the right entry is the student’s ranking of
the college.
m w m0 w0
Z ð; 2Þ ð; 2Þ# ð; 1Þ# ð; 1Þ
A ð1; 3Þ# ð2; 1Þ ð4; 3Þ ð3; 2Þ
B ð2; 1Þ ð3; 3Þ ð4; 2Þ ð1; 3Þ#
The only stable matching is the student optimal matching : One sees this by
checking from the algorithm that it is also the college optimal matching. But the
matching # makes all colleges (strictly) better off. Of course # is unstable, being
blocked by Z and m:
Example 7. As shown in Corollary 4, in the classical model all stable matchings are
comparable for each agent. This need not be so in the nonclassical model.
Colleges A and B have quota 2: Students are m; w; m0; w0; and A and B are like Z in
Example 6 except A most prefers mw and B most prefers m0w0: For the students, m
and w prefer B to A; m0 and w0 prefer A to B:
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One easily verifies that all four ways of allocating diverse pairs to A and B are
stable and also that mw0 and m0w are noncomparable in the preferences of both A
and B:
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